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Quick View 
 
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in D’Arcy v Myriad 
Genetics Inc [2014] FCAFC 1152 recently upheld the validity of Myriad 
Genetics’ Australian BRCA1 gene patent over isolated DNA sequences. 
The five judges who constituted the court in a joint judgment 
unanimously held that isolating a DNA sequence from its surrounding 
genetic material involves more than simply taking the nucleic acid out of the 
cell, and instead involves structural and functional changes that create a new 
composition of matter. The court thus took the view that the patent in 
question claims something other than subject matter that had previously 
existed in nature, and as such, the isolated nucleic acid, including cDNA, 
constitutes patentable subject matter. 
The expressly court rejected the conclusion reached last year by the US 
Supreme Court in AMP v Myriad Genetics that isolated genes and the 
information they encode are not patent eligible. Instead, it adopted the 
reasoning of Judges Lourie and Moore in the Federal Circuit below, finding 
that isolated genes are not naturally-occurring substances but are “the 
products of man.” At paragraph [212] the court said that: 
 
What is being claimed is not the nucleic acid as it exists in the 
human body, but the nucleic acid as isolated from the cell. The 
claimed product is not the same as the naturally occurring product. 
There are structural differences but, more importantly, there are 
functional differences because of isolation. 
 
Although the court characterised isolated DNA as material derived from 
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naturally occurring material, it held that this is not a reason for it to be 
excluded from patentability. In this regard, the court by reference to 
precedent explained the distinction between a discovery (and an idea in the 
abstract) and an invention at paragraphs [111] to [113]. The court thus took 
the view that in determining whether an invention is patentable subject 
matter, there is no requirement for a consideration of whether a claimed 
composition of matter is a “product of nature” or whether a microorganism is 
“markedly different” from something that already exists in nature. The court 
also noted at paragraph [155] that “the analysis should focus on differences 
in structure and function effected by the intervention of man and not on the 
similarities [with what is found in nature].” 
The court, for the purposes of Australian law, sought to delineate 
patentable and non-patentable subject matter by stating that, “[a] mere 
discovery is not patentable and an idea is not patentable, but a “manner of 
manufacture”, as that term has been developed, is.” In doing so, the court 
rejected any suggested that there is a “product of nature” subject matter 
exclusion in Australian law. 
Unlike the US Supreme Court, the Full Federal Court considered that the 
correct approach when determining patentable subject matter is to focus on 
the products of human ingenuity claimed (in this instance being the isolated 
nucleotide sequences) and not on the information that they contain. In this 
regard, the court criticised the US Supreme Court noting at paragraph [215] 
that: 
 
It is difficult to reconcile that Court’s endorsement of the reasoning 
in Chakrabarty, with its rejection of isolated nucleic acid as eligible 
for patentability. With respect, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the 
similarity of ‘the location and order of the nucleotides’ existing 
within the nucleic acid in nature before Myriad found them is 
misplaced. It is the chemical changes in the isolated nucleic acid 
which are of critical importance, as this is what distinguishes the 
product as artificial and economically useful. 
 
Unlike in places such as the United States and Canada where subject 
matter eligibility is defined by reference to enumerated classes of subject 
matter, the scope of patentable subject matter in Australia is defined by 
reference to whether an invention is a “manner of manufacture” of the kind 
envisaged by s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623. 
While it is difficult to fault the Full Federal Court’s reasoning, it is 
unlikely that this will be the final chapter in Myriad’s defense of its 
Australian patent. Rather, it is likely that the unsuccessful applicant in this 
instance will appeal to the High Court of Australia, Australia’s final court of 
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appeal, and that that the High Court will give leave (a statutory equivalent to 
certiorari) to hear the appeal given the importance of the subject matter 
concerned. 
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